DESTITUENT power may be understood, then, as an exodus from the order of sovereignty altogether, neither operating within it, nor seeking to capture it in a revolutionary sense, nor even seeking to destroy it: all these moves are, in a sense, caught up within the paradigm of sovereignty. Rather, destituent power suspends the very order of sovereignty and invokes a form of life, activity and politics that is autonomous from it.
What Is An Insurrection?

Destituent Power and Ontological Anarchy in Agamben and Stirner

Saul Newman

2016
WORKS CITED

Abbott M (2014) *The Figure of This World: Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology.*


Castells M (2015) *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age.*


this through the idea of insurrection, which I have developed with reference to the ontologically anarchic thinking of Stirner and Agamben. As I have argued, the insurrection is a destitution of political power: it seeks to suspend—rather than destroy and reinstitute—governing political power, thereby opening up autonomous spaces in the social landscape in which alternative forms of subjectivity, association and political and ethical practice can emerge. As we have seen, insurrection involves a certain profaning of established political concepts such as sovereignty, representation and political agency.

The key concepts I have explored—of ownness, inoperativity, singularity, ontological anarchy and indeed the insurrection itself—may at first seem unfamiliar to the usual categories of political thought. Yet they are intended to resist the traps of sovereign power, and therefore cannot be assimilated to any sort of hegemonic project. Indeed, they are intended precisely to destabilise and profane many of the familiar normative coordinates of politics. However, I have argued that such a profanation is necessary if we are to adequately comprehend the new forms of post-sovereign political activism and mobilisation we are increasingly witness to today.

The aim of this article is to develop a theoretical understanding of the insurrection as a central concept in radical politics. The notion of insurrection has been increasingly deployed as a way of describing recent uprisings around the world—from Tahrir Square to Occupy Wall Street, from the ‘movement of the squares’ in Madrid and Athens to Gezi Park in Istanbul (see Invisible Committee, 2008, 2014). Here, one observes a form of action and mobilisation reducible neither to simple acts of civil disobedience, nor to a classical revolutionary model of politics. Instead, these movements signify a kind of withdrawal from formal systems of power; their emphasis is on the creation of autonomous communal spaces and modes of interaction rather than on the construction of political agendas and the representation of demands to the state. By contrast, the idea of revolution, as the seizure of political power by an organised vanguard party, seems less easy to appeal to today. Despite attempts recently by some political theorists to resuscitate and rethink the idea of the vanguard party (see, for instance, Dean, 2012)—others suggest that this has been entirely superseded by a new model of emancipatory politics, in which self-organisation and the desire for autonomy from state institutions are the defining features (see Castells, 2015; Graeber, 2009, 2014). Whereas the revolution is an instrumental form of action which aims, through organised political force, to seize the reins of government and use state power to transform the totality of social relations—that is, to constitute a new society—insurrection works within the fabric of existing social relations, opening up spaces of resistance and autonomy that are in a sense immanent within it. It does not seek to impose a unified political will to reshape or reconstitute society according to a particular vision or plan but, rather, affirms, in a pre-figurative way, a free form of activity and being-in-common in the present.
My aim here is to understand the insurrection as a distinct idea of politics. I will do this in a slightly oblique way by exploring the parallel thinking of contemporary Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, and nineteenth-century German philosopher and Young Hegelian, Max Stirner. I will argue that, despite their differences, they share an insurrectionary theoretical approach which can help us clarify the coordinates of the contemporary political horizon. I shall suggest that both thinkers propose a form of political activity and ethics which is neither Marxist nor, strictly speaking, anarchist—although it is certainly closer to the latter—and which is reducible neither to constituent nor constituted power but which, rather, affirms a kind of destituent power or, as I put it, an indifference to power.

I will trace this theme through a number of points of intersection. First, I will explore the structural similarities between Stirner’s model of insurrection or ‘ uprising ’ and Agamben’s notion of destituent power. Second, I will link these parallel concepts to a notion of ontological anarchism, which I argue both thinkers are in different ways committed to, despite their ambivalent relationship to anarchism as a political ideology. I interpret ontological anarchism here in terms of a non-foundational approach to politics in which essential identities and fixed normative categories are destabilised. Third, I explore what I see as the profane thinking characteristic of both thinkers—that is, the attempt to desacralise life, to free it from the abstract and theological categories in which it has hitherto been trapped. Next, I examine the implications this has for subjectivity: both thinkers, in different ways, put forward an alternative notion of the subject as being without vocation—that is, without a pre-defined purpose or telos. Here, I draw on Stirner’s related notions of egoism and ‘ ownness ’, and Agamben’s ideas of ‘ whatever singularity ’ and ‘ form of life ’. Last, I will show how important differences between these thinkers emerge around questions of agency, community and political action, which highlight some of the key dilemmas facing a contingent political association formed by individual egoists for their own ends. Agamben, on the other hand, starts with the question of the community, seeking to rethink it as a space for new forms of inoperative life—hence his interest in the ‘ coming political community ’ of stateless people (Agamben, 1996: 158–164) or in the rule-bound life of monastic communities (Agamben, 2013). Yet, as different as these perspectives are, they share a concern with modes of interaction and association which are autonomous from established forms of political community—in the sovereign state, in which the subject is coercively included or, as Agamben would have it, included in the form of a potential exclusion (Agamben, 1998).

CONCLUSION

The opaqueness of these formulations no doubt makes them difficult to apply in any sort of direct way to contemporary social and political movements—and perhaps it is asking too much to do so. If one is looking for a precise programme of political organisation or action in Stirner and Agamben’s writing, then one will be disappointed. Moreover, seeking in these thinkers an insurrectionary political ontology which can shed some light on our contemporary political horizon does not mean that one can be blind to the important differences between particular movements and radical political struggles, which might emerge in very different contexts. To say that, for instance, in Occupy Wall Street and Tahrir Square one could find examples of destituent and insurrectionary forms of politics—in the manner I have theorised—does not mean, of course, that they were the same events, or that people in these situations mobilised around the same issues and concerns. Rather, my claim has been that in the modes of interaction and organisation characteristic of many such movements—in their decentralised structures, their largely spontaneous mobilisation, their non-representative forms of political expression—one can find a new form of post-sovereign politics that does not seek hegemony within state institutions—either in a reformist or revolutionary sense—but rather seeks to cultivate autonomous forms of political association and life. I have sought to understand

---

1. It is significant that Stephane Hessel, in his 2010 pamphlet *Indignez-Vous!*, which inspired many such uprisings, refers specifically to (non-violent) insurrection.
destiny in the structure of the subject—even if this destiny is one of ‘worklessness’ and inoperativity; hence the importance of messianic time in Agamben’s thought (see Agamben, 2005b). By contrast, Stirner’s non-messianic ontological anarchism realises itself in the form of a radical freedom and autonomy—an open space for action, contingency and becoming; the subject here, it might be said, is genuinely anarchic, rather than being determined by any notion of messianic time.

These different approaches explain, furthermore, why Agamben is deeply suspicious of the idea of free will and voluntarism (see Agamben, 2013), whereas Stirner, while acknowledging the highly ambiguous meaning of freedom under liberalism, at the same time proposes a much more radical notion of self-ownership and autonomy, from which springs the potential for egoistic self-emancipation. Both theorists propose an indifference to power, yet this is understood in different ways and has different political consequences. For Agamben, this would seem to translate into the sort of radical, yet ultimately self-sacrificial, passivity exemplified by Bartleby, who is indifferent not only to the external conditions around him but also, in a sense, to his self, to his own life. For Stirner, on the other hand, as we shall see below, indifference to power translates into an affirmation of the self and a capacity for autonomous action. Yet, while these are important differences, they emerge, I would suggest, from a shared understanding of the subject as a being without essential foundation or identity. Moreover, while one might be tempted to regard Stirner’s more wilful notion of agency as being still too close to the revolutionary paradigm of constituent power, his theory of insurrection, at least on my reading, makes it clear that the individual does not will a new form of power or a new form of society, but rather simply willed herself: it is, as he puts it, ‘a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it’.

Of course, many important questions remain concerning political organisation and community. Indeed, the very question of community marks a further difference between these two thinkers: Stirner starts with the individual egoist and is suspicious of all forms of collective organisation, apart from those freely determined by the individual himself—I have already made reference to the ‘union of egoists’, which is radical politics today. Here, I will argue that Stirner’s ‘egoistic’ and voluntarist approach to insurrection provides a more tangible and positive way of thinking about political action than Agamben’s at times vague, albeit highly suggestive, notion of inoperativity. My overall aim in teasing out these points of convergence and difference is to formulate an alternative model of insurrectionary political theory as a way of understanding non-hegemonic, post-sovereign forms of radical politics today.

INSURRECTION AND REVOLUTION

Stirner and Agamben are two thinkers not often considered together. Their thinking emerges within, and responds to, different philosophical traditions—nineteenth-century Hegelianism and humanism in the case of the former, and twentieth-century Heideggerian philosophy and contemporary currents of post-Althusserian, post-Foucauldian thought in the latter. Moreover, while their thinking might be characterised as ‘anarchistic’ in the sense that both oppose the sovereignty of the state (see Bargu, 2011), their relationship to the anarchist tradition is ambiguous. Yet there are, I would suggest, important connections between them, particularly in their ontologically anarchic understanding of the subject as a being without foundation, essence or telos. Indeed, for both thinkers, subjectivity is an ‘ungovernable’ space of life which exceeds, and is indifferent to, abstract norms, ideological categories and political institutions founded upon metaphysical thinking (see De Ridder, 2011: 143–164; Heron, 2011).

What interests me in these two thinkers is the way that—in critically engaging with politics at an ontological level (see Abbott, 2014; Jenkins, 2014)—they radically destabilise existing political categories and institutions, thus opening up an alternative space in which new and more autonomous forms of subjectivity, action and community can emerge. Yet it is perhaps because of their indifference to the existing normative coordinates of politics that they have often faced accusations from various quarters of nihilism or, at best, political irrelevance (see Paterson, 1971; Virno, 2002). Yet, although Stirner and Agamben are resistant to making explicit political gestures of any kind, my
argument is that their ontologically anarchic approach to subjectivity and action—while it has different implications for each thinker—radically transforms our understanding of politics, particularly in the context of the dilemmas faced by activists today following the eclipse of the horizon of revolutionary politics.

My premise is that the Marxist–Leninist project of revolution—that is, the attempt to transform the field of social relations through the seizure of state power—is no longer operative today, and that we need a new ‘non-strategic’ paradigm of political action that, at the same time, contests and transcends the current neoliberal order in which politics has for the past decades been trapped. The emergence of waves of resistance to global capitalism following the uprising against the World Trade Organization (WTO) summit in Seattle in 1999, through to more recent articulations in the Occupy movement, has led to a renewed interest in anarchism as an alternative non-Marxist or non-Leninist form of radical politics, especially because of the decentralised, democratic ‘networked’ structures and forms of direct, extra-institutional action they seem to embody (see Bray, 2013; Day, 2005; Gordon, 2008; Graeber, 2002; Jun and Wahl, 2010; Maeckelbergh, 2009). Such practices are closer perhaps to the anarchist understanding of social revolution—as distinct from a purely political revolution (see Bakunin, 1971: 180)—in the sense that they involve attempts to transform from the ground up and in a ‘prefigurative’ way one’s immediate social relationships, as well as promoting radical change at a broader social and political level.

I would like to think more carefully about the space of mediation between action that transforms one’s immediate circumstances and relations with others—what might be called micro-political action—and macro-political action aimed at transforming society at a broader level. For the anarchist Gustav Landauer any kind of revolutionary action always presupposed an ethical transformation in one’s everyday relations with others: ‘The state is a social relationship; a certain way of people relating to one another. It can be destroyed by creating new social relationships; i.e., by people relating to one another differently’ (Landauer, 2010: 213–214). It is precisely in this space between individual ethical transformation and political action that we should situate our

Stirner’s egoist, whose existence is an empty, anarchic space, a ‘creative Nothing’ (Stirner, 1995: 7) Agamben sees Bartleby as ‘the extreme figure of the Nothing from which all creation derives; and at the same time, he constitutes the most implacable vindication of this Nothing as pure, absolute potentiality’ (Agamben, 1999: 253–254).

It is at this point, however, that a certain important difference becomes apparent between Stirner and Agamben, and where, I would argue, Stirner’s notion of ownness offers a more positive figure of resistance and political action than can be found in Agamben’s at times opaque and ambiguous notion of inoperativeness. The problem with Agamben lies not so much in his refusal to appeal to explicit normative categories—indeed, his reticence about proposing alternative modes of political practice reflects in many ways a desire to break decisively with these coordinates—but rather in the passivity implicit in his notion of inoperativeness. It has to be remembered that Bartleby—this paradigmatic figure of resistance—dies of starvation in prison, ‘preferring not to’ eat. At least for Stirner, the ownness of the slave—with which I have drawn a certain parallel with Bartleby’s eerie self-possession—serves as a basis for his active self-emancipation from his master: ‘That I then become free from him and his whip is only the consequence of my antecedent egoism’ (Stirner, 1995: 143).

The difference between the two thinkers here centres around their alternative approaches to the question of agency. While both propose a non-essentialist or ontologically anarchic understanding of subjectivity, different conceptions of agency nevertheless flow from this. For Agamben, indeterminacy is accompanied by—indeed is understood in terms of—a certain determinacy: our absence of destiny and lack of vocation does not mean that we are free to simply choose our subjectivity, but rather that our lack of vocation is our destiny, our calling as human beings. As Agamben puts it, man is ‘the Sabbatical animal par excellence’ (Agamben, 2011: 246). For Stirner, on the other hand, the fact that our subjectivity is without foundation, essence or calling makes available to us a space of radical freedom and contingency, a freedom to constitute our subjectivity in a multitude of different ways. Put simply, Agamben’s ontological anarchism paradoxically reveals a certain anthropological...
freedom available to us today, particularly in liberal regimes where freedom is simply the mode by which we are governed. The problem with freedom is that it is enshrined within a certain normative regime and system of power (the liberal state) such that the more we exercise freedom within these coordinates, the more we are inscribed within this regime (Stirner, 1995: 145). Therefore, freedom must be left to the ‘unique one’ to determine for him- or herself. It should be seen as an ongoing project of individual autonomy rather than a general political and social goal; freedom as a singular practice, unique to the individual, rather than a universally proclaimed ideal and aspiration. Freedom as a concept is therefore to be profaned—divested of its abstractions and brought down to the level of the individual. Importantly, whereas freedom is something that can be determined and constrained by the state, ownness is something which always remains with individuals:

My own I am at all times and under all circumstances, if I know how to have myself and do not throw myself away on others. To be free is something that I cannot truly will, because I cannot make it, cannot create it (Stirner, 1995: 143).

Resembling Bartleby’s serene self-possession, even when finally confined in a prison, Stirner’s figure of the slave—although deprived of freedom—still retains his sense of ownness: ‘The fetters of reality cut the sharpest welts in my flesh every moment. But my own I remain’ (Stirner, 1995: 143). Ownness is, therefore, a way of thinking about freedom as inoperativity. Rather than seeing freedom as a political goal to be achieved, or as the universal destiny of humankind, ownness—as an ontologically anarchic concept—refers to the capacity for freedom that one already has, as the condition of one’s existence. Bartleby is free in an ontological sense; in his gentle, yet persistent, refusal he is simply affirming this ungovernability or ownness as the basis of his very being, something which is always available to him and can never be taken away. In this sense, he lives outside power, as though power did not exist. Bartleby’s very existence is ontologically anarchic and might be seen as the embodiment of a profound indifference to power. Very much like
discussion of Agamben and Stirner.

On one of the few occasions that Agamben refers to Stirner directly, it is in relation to his notion of the insurrection. Agamben sees Stirner’s insurrection as a destituting line of flight from the state, a form of personal ‘ethical-anarchic’ revolt and an ‘egoistic act of subtraction’ that presented a serious challenge to Marx’s revolutionary politics based on the collective class subject (see Agamben, 2004a: 115–124, 2005b: 31–32). So we need to turn our attention to the concept of insurrection (Empörung or ‘Uprising’), which Stirner distinguishes from revolution:

Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men’s discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The Revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on ‘institutions’. It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established (Stirner, 1995: 279–280; all emphasis in original).

Where the revolution works to transform external social and political conditions and institutions, the insurrection is aimed at one’s own self-transformation (it starts ‘from men’s discontent with themselves’). It involves placing oneself above external conditions and constraints, whereupon these constraints simply disintegrate; it starts from the affirmation of the self, and the political consequences flow from this. The insurrection, unlike the revolution, works against institutions—but not necessarily in the sense of seeking to get rid of all institutions, as this would lead simply to different kinds of institutions—but rather in the sense of asserting one’s power over institutions, and indeed, one’s
autonomy from them. It suggests a way of unbinding ourselves from systems of power and our dependency on them, even our desire for them (it is a ‘working forth of me out of the established’). It is, more precisely, extra-institutional rather than anti-institutional.

We can see that this notion of insurrection is radically different from most understandings of political action. It eschews the idea of an overarching project of emancipation; freedom is not the end goal of the insurrection but, rather, its starting point. In this sense, it is ontologically anarchist; it emanates from a radical indeterminacy that characterises subjectivity. In other words, the insurrection starts not with the desire to change the external conditions that might be said to oppress the individual, but rather with the assertion of the self over these conditions. So, rather than a revolutionary project which sets itself the goal of liberating people from institutionalised power—and which risks merely imposing upon them another kind of power in its place—the insurrection allows people to constitute their own freedom by first reclaiming their own self.

**DESTITUENT POWER**

To grasp the insurrection in its specificity, it is necessary to relate it to the category of destituent power, which has become more prominent in discussions of recent mobilisations against neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, the concept of destituent power first emerged in the analysis by Colectivo Situaciones of the popular uprisings against neoliberal policies in Argentina in 2001. ‘Poder destituyente’ referred to a specific kind of political action that took the form of a refusal of the legitimacy of governing political and legal institutions. This was symbolised by the slogan of these movements: ‘Que se vayan todos!’ (‘They all must go!’), signifying a complete rejection of Argentina’s political and economic elites. Destituent power referred, then, to an extra-institutional form of political mobilisation that sought autonomy from state institutions rather than representing specific demands and interests through the state. However, this uprising was at the same time different from a revolution: it was not an attempt to violently overthrow the existing rather, profanes it, suspending its operation and fostering instead autonomous relations and forms of subjectivity. Central to this is Agamben’s key idea of inoperativeness or inoperativity. Inoperativity is a form of activity that is no longer consigned to ‘work’ and which is freed from any overarching project or telos. Indeed, for Agamben, rather than politics being about the strategic pursuit of universal ends or the fulfilment of a historical destiny—such as liberal democracy or communism—it is more fundamentally about this ‘being-without-work’ or the absence of vocation proper to human life (Agamben, 2000: 140–141). Yet, to understand this thoroughly we must consider the closely related notion of potentiality, which, Agamben argues, is only meaningful if it includes the ontological condition of impotentiality. Here, his interpretation of Aristotle’s dynamis emphasises the ‘want of potentiality’: the potential to do or to be is thus also the potential ‘not to be’ or ‘not to do’ (Agamben, 1999: 182–183).

There is, for Agamben, a radical potentiality and power contained in not acting, a potentiality that is dangerous to governing regimes precisely insofar as it is withheld, suspended, not put to use. At times, simply refusing to act, refusing to be drawn into codified forms of action—even those that ostensibly protest against and oppose governing liberal-capitalist regimes—is actually more threatening to these regimes than acting.

The most famous example of this inoperative potentiality provided by Agamben is the enigmatic figure of Bartleby, from Herman Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener (Agamben, 1999: 243–274). Bartleby, a law copyist, calmly refuses every request made of him by his increasingly exasperated boss with the enigmatic phrase ‘I would prefer not to’—a simple gesture of passive refusal which throws into disarray the whole structure of workplace authority. Symbolically speaking, this gesture is one of withdrawal or exodus from the system of power rather than active resistance to it. It is not a revolutionary action which constitutes a new set of arrangements, nor is it one of mere opposition; rather, it is a gesture of indifference to power, which at the same time deactivates or disorders it. Bartleby can be seen here as a paradigm of destituent power.

There is a clear parallel here, I believe, with Stirner’s notion of ‘ownness’. Ownness is Stirner’s answer to the wholly inadequate forms of...
I posit myself’ (Stirner, 1995: 135).

There is a striking parallel here, I would suggest, between the ‘unique one’ and Agamben’s figure of ‘whatever singularity’—an open, undefinable subject indifferent to any representable identity, and reducible neither to particularities nor generalities. Moreover, it is the coming together of these open, empty, undefinable singularities that poses an unacceptable threat to the state precisely because they evade the representational channels of state power. Agamben’s powerful example here is the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 (see Agamben, 2000: 85–88) although we could point to more recent examples such as Tahrir Square and Occupy. Such convergences of ‘whatever singularities’—which signal what Agamben calls ‘the coming community’—strongly echo Stirner’s enigmatic and seemingly paradoxical notion of the ‘union of egoists’ (see Stirner, 1995: 161).

What is embodied within these various figures of ontologically anarchic subjectivity, then, is the possibility of a non-sovereign politics. In other words, in wanting to free subjectivity from essence, identity and telos, Stirner and Agamben point to the possibility of alternative, non-statist and autonomous forms of association and community which are not representable through existing political categories and institutions; which are perhaps—indeed inevitably—vaguely defined, but which open up an alternative insurrectionary horizon for politics.

PASSIVE AND ACTIVE INSURRECTIONS: INOPERATIVITY AND OWNNESS

I have characterised the insurrection as a mode of political action that neither seeks power nor opposes it in any simplistic sense but which,

7. This similarity has also been noted by Banu Bargu (see Bargu, 2011: 108).

political system with a view to establishing a new one in its place. Rather the Argentinan insurrection signified a de-instituting, rather than instituting, moment: a withdrawal of support from the sovereign political order, without the desire to replace it with another sovereign political order. Sovereignty is instead suspended, deposed, de-instituted. Colectivo Situaciones refers, then, to a movement that ‘far from founding a new sovereign order, operates by delegitimising the politics executed in its name’ (Colectivo Situaciones, 2002: 52). However, as it points out, this refusal of sovereignty does not make such movements apolitical; rather, ‘to renounce support to a representative (sovereign) politics is the condition—and the premise—of situational thinking and of a series of practices whose meanings are no longer demanded from the state’ (Colectivo Situaciones, 2002: 53–54). The de-instituting gesture characteristic of such movements does not renounce politics as such, but instead opens up alternative spaces for political practices, discourses and forms of association which exceed the state and whose meaning is no longer determined by it.

A similar notion of destituent power has been proposed by political theorist Raffaele Laudani who, in reference to radical social movements not only in Latin America but also in the Middle East (the Arab Spring) and throughout Europe and North America, also points to a rejection of established modes of representation. Destituent action, in contrast to civil disobedience, is not the desire to change particular laws or government policies, but instead refuses the very legitimacy of the political-legal order by withdrawing support from it. Yet, as Laudani argues, destituent power is also distinct from revolutionary action and cannot be seen as simply anti-institutional:

Despite carrying clear libertarian instances, destituent power is not anti-institutional per se, because, on the contrary, it makes the

2. A similar point is made by Illan Run Wall, who argues that the Tunisian Revolution can be seen as a suspension of what Carl Schmitt saw as the inevitable sovereign decision, and therefore as a suspension of the will to constitute an alternative politico-legal order (Wall, 2012).
assumption of the nonartificial and ineradicable presence of power and its institutions. Its action is instead extrastitutional, in the sense that unlike revolution and other forms of modern political action inspired by constituent power, it is not primarily motivated by an institutionalizing end (Laudani, 2013: 4–5).

This is an important point which will become central to my own theorisation of the destituent dimension of the insurrection: unlike revolutions, which always risk the re-institution of power, insurrections, in suspending the operation of power, seek to keep open a space of political contingency in which new and autonomous practices, discourses and relations might emerge.

We should distinguish, then, between constituent and destituent power: the former refers to the revolutionary capacity, which Abbe Sieyes believed lay in the People, to constitute a political order; while the latter does not propose to found a new political order, but implies the suspension of all orders. The problem with constituent power—of the kind, for instance proposed by Antonio Negri (see Negri, 1999: 10)—is that it becomes part of the founding mythology of the sovereign state, and is therefore trapped within the dialectic between the constituent power of the People and the constituted legal and political order, even as it claims to exceed and resist it. In the analysis of the Invisible Committee: ‘Constituent power names that monstrous piece of magic that turns the state into an entity that’s never wrong’. That is why they propose instead the destituting power of insurrections: ‘To destitute power is to deprive it of its foundation. That is precisely what insurrections do’ (Invisible Committee, 2014: 26).

To understand more precisely this notion of the insurrection as destituting power, we can turn to Giorgio Agamben’s own conceptualisation of the problem:

If the fundamental ontological question today is not work but inoperativity, and if this inoperativity can, however, be deployed only through a work, then the corresponding political concept can no longer be that of ‘constituent power’ [potere constituente], but human, of man as distinct from the animal—as has been the characteristic gesture of the Western philosophical and indeed political tradition—one ends up simply animalising man or at least certain kinds of men. A similar point is made by Stirner, who shows that the sacralising of man produces the ‘un-man’ as the irreducible remainder: ‘the un-man is a man who does not correspond to the concept man, as the inhuman is something human which is not conformed to the concept of the human’ (see Stirner, 1995: 159).

Is there a way of thinking about subjectivity that avoids this political anthropology and the alienating divisions it imposes? I would argue that both Agamben and Stirner propose an insurrectionary or ontologically anarchic understanding of the subject: a form of subjectivity which is not founded on any essence or firm ontological category, and which is not reducible to any kind of fixed identity; a form of subjectivity without a particular telos or destiny which would otherwise bind us to systems of sovereign power. This is what Agamben is proposing with his notion of form-of-life, in which it is not possible to isolate a dimension of bare life and in which ‘the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power’ (Agamben, 2000: 2–3).

This profane conception of life, freed from abstractions, and in which the divisions between bios and zoe, between politically qualified life and bare or natural life, are suspended, finds a surprising parallel with Stirner’s peculiar understanding of egoism. Egoism might be understood as a way of living and seeing oneself outside of the humanist abstractions and fixed ideas which otherwise consign us to systems of sovereign power. This is what Agamben is proposing with his notion of form-of-life, in which it is not possible to isolate a dimension of bare life and in which ‘the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power’ (Agamben, 2000: 2–3).

This profane conception of life, freed from abstractions, and in which the divisions between bios and zoe, between politically qualified life and bare or natural life, are suspended, finds a surprising parallel with Stirner’s peculiar understanding of egoism. Egoism might be understood as a way of living and seeing oneself outside of the humanist abstractions and fixed ideas which otherwise consign us to an alienated existence. So far from implying a simple selfishness, egoism is a singular form of life that is no longer consignable to any generality, be it essence, species, class, citizenship or even the abstract liberal category of ‘the individual’. Rather the ego (der Einzige) or, more accurately, the ‘unique one’, resists all such identities and categories and is an open, fluid space—a kind of continual becoming without any foundation, essence or destiny: ‘I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just positing or creating myself, and am I only by being not presupposed but posited, and, again, posited only in the moment when
we have seen, replaces divine authority with human authority; yet, in doing so, it only reinvents the sacred in a human guise, transposing it onto secular liberal institutions. Ultimately, it does nothing to remove the place of divine authority and in this sense it might be likened to the instituting power of revolutions. Profanation, on the other hand, seeks to undermine the category of the sacred—not by putting something new in its place but by reclaiming and using the 'objects' normally caught within this category in new and unprecedented ways. Agamben’s example is that of reclaiming the law for human use—treating it, as it were, as a plaything rather than a sacred object endowed with a kind of mystical authority (Agamben, 2005a: 64).  

SINGULARITIES

The theological dimension, which yet persists within modern forms of politics, produces certain degraded forms of subjectivity, precisely because it seeks to capture in a separate and sacred domain an essential identity we are required to live up to, and we are excluded if we do not. Thus, for Agamben, the continual attempt to separate bios from zoe, to isolate a dimension of bare life as distinct from politically qualified life, produces forms of disqualified subjectivity—exemplified by the figure of homo sacer—which are caught within the sovereign state of exception and are subject to state violence (see Agamben, 1998). Indeed, this is an aspect of a more general rationality operating at the heart of modernity which, according to Agamben, seeks to separate the non-human within the human (Agamben, 2004b: 37–38). In projecting a figure of the longer that meta-force which regiments, commands, or condemns all potentialities. All motherfuckers have addresses. To destitute power is to bring it back down to earth’ (Invisible Committee, 2014: 26).

6. Stirner makes a similar point about play as a form of profanation: ‘perhaps children make the best use of the Bible itself when they play with it, thus turning it into an ordinary plaything and freeing it from its sacred, absolute dimension such that it has no more power over us’ (Stirner, 1896: 219).

I will return to this important concept of inoperativity, but it is clear at this stage that Agamben has in mind a form of political activity completely different from the revolutionary projects of the past: many of those projects of emancipation ended up instrumentalising political power in ways that led to their own ossification. Conceiving of politics as a project, as a goal-oriented form of activity which subordinates means to ends—and in doing so ends up sacrificing those very ends themselves—is precisely what Agamben is getting at when he refers to ‘work’, to politics as work. Instead, he affirms a form of pre-figurative political activity understood in terms of inoperativity, which I read as a kind of withdrawal from the ontological order of power and from all overarching political projects. Destituent power may be understood, then, as an exodus from the order of sovereignty altogether, neither operating within it, nor seeking to capture it in a revolutionary sense, nor even seeking to destroy it: all these moves are, in a sense, caught up within the paradigm of sovereignty. Rather, destituent power suspends the very order of sovereignty and invokes a form of life, activity and politics that is autonomous from it.

ONTLOGICAL ANARCHISM

Stirner’s insurrection and Agamben’s destituent power both invoke, then, a kind of extra-institutional politics which withdraws from the sovereignty of the state and affirms an autonomous form of life and activity. While this of course bears some resemblance to anarchism, we must be slightly careful here: neither Stirner nor Agamben can accurately be described as anarchists, at least according to the familiar coordinates of that ideological tradition. Neither thinker, for instance, relies on an ontological foundation in human nature, nor social relations, as
profanation is a form of ‘negligence’ that ignores separation, thereby nullifying the abstract and sacred dimension: ‘Profanation ... neutralizes what it profanes, that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use’. While secularisation perpetuates power by reaffirming the sacred—as we have seen through Stirner’s critique of humanism and liberalism—profanation ‘deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common use the spaces that power had seized’ (Agamben, 2007: 77). We find something very similar in Stirner, where the strategy of ‘egoism’ is to

> **“But around the altar rise the arches of a church, and its walls keep moving further and further out. What they enclose is sacred. You can no longer get to it, no longer touch it. Shrieking with the hunger that devours you, you wander round about these walls in search of the li...”**

*Stirner, 1995: 89.*

The egoist seeks out the profane as the last respite from the ever-expanding realm of the sacred. Yet the only way to preserve the profane is to profane the sacred, to seize hold of it with unhallowed hands, devour it or, as Agamben would put it, return it to common use.

I want to suggest here that profanation, as proposed by both these thinkers, is something like an insurrectionary strategy. Secularism, as

5. Indeed, the Invisible Committee see the insurrection precisely as a form of political profanation which divests sovereign power of its metaphysical aura: ‘In insurrection, the power in place is just one force among others from the perspective of common struggle, and no
However, I want to explore this problem at a deeper level through Stirner’s critique of secular humanism in *The Ego and Its Own (Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum)*. Here, Stirner took issue with the secular and humanist project of his contemporary, Ludwig Feuerbach. In Feuerbach’s attempt to displace Christianity and to replace God with Man, Stirner perceived not an insurrection against theology so much as a *theological insurrection* that merely substituted one form of religious alienation and idealism for another: ‘the newest revolts against God are nothing but the extremest efforts of “theology”, that is, theological insurrections’ (Stirner, 1995: 30). Stirner therefore questions the idea of secular emancipation. Rather than destroying the categories of religious authority and alienation, Feuerbach has only inverted the terms and placed the figure of Man within it, turning him into a new God: ‘The human religion is only the last metamorphosis of the Christian religion’ (Stirner, 1995: 158). According to Stirner, the modern secular consciousness continues to be plagued by religiously inspired ideas—what Stirner calls ‘spooks’—now in a humanist guise, such as morality, humanity, truth and society (Stirner, 1995: 43). These ideas have become absolute and universal, assuming a religious sacredness; this has an alienating effect on the individual subject who seeks his or her own ‘essence’ and identity within these external ideological categories, and is forced to conform to a moralistic ideal of humanity.

So the question is how can this political-theological authority be resisted? As we have seen, secularisation only perpetuates its existence and cannot be the answer. An alternative strategy is one of the profaning, which is what both thinkers in different ways propose. We must be clear, though, that profanation is not the same as transgression, which, in itself, only reaffirms that which is transgressed. Rather, to profane is to return to its ordinary, everyday place something that had been hitherto removed to a sacred, abstracted place. As Agamben says, be conflated with anarchism; and actually here Agamben echoes a point made by many anarchists themselves who distinguish between anarchy as disorder and chaos, and anarchism as a viable form of social order without a state (Agamben, 2014: 73).

What I want to suggest is that both Agamben and Stirner—while their politics cannot be reduced to anarchism in any simplistic sense—might nevertheless be considered *ontologically anarchic* political thinkers. By this I mean that they are interested in displacing forms of sovereign power without necessarily proposing any alternative (even non-statist or anarchist) social order in its place; in this sense, their thinking is insurrectionary rather than revolutionary, according to the distinction I have drawn above.³ Agamben himself, while pointing to the structural complicity between anarchy and power, wants to extract from this a different understanding of anarchy—one that no longer serves power but, on the contrary, fundamentally displaces it:

Since power (*arché*) constitutes itself through the inclusive exclusion (*the ex-ception*) of anarchy, the only possibility of thinking a true anarchy coincides with the exhibition of the anarchy internal to power. Anarchy is that which becomes possible only in the moment that we grasp and destitute the anarchy of power (Agamben, 2014: 72).

According to Agamben, then, power captures anarchy: anarchy is the secret of power, the empty throne behind the veils of sovereignty; it is the nihilism at the heart of all systems of government. To extract from this a different, more positive figure of anarchy, the blind, anarchic operation of power must be revealed and brought to its conclusion.

To understand this, I want to propose a conception of ontological

---

³ It should be clear that this notion of insurrection has little to do with the insurrectionary anarchism of Alfredo Bonnano who, while rejecting the revolutionary dogmatism of his anarchist contemporaries in the 1980s, advocated instead forms of violent direct action against the state (see Bonnano, 1988).
anarchy derived from the Heideggerian thinker Reiner Schürmann. For Schürmann, the experience of anarchy is a fading away of epochal principles. Unlike in metaphysical thinking, where action has always to be derived from and determined by a first principle—the arché—“anarchy” ... always designates the withering away of such a rule, the relaxing of its hold (Schürmann, 1987: 6). Anarchy is therefore the de-grounding or removing of the absolute authority of the arché—a form of ontological anti-authoritarianism. However, this experience of anarchy—understood here in terms of indeterminacy, contingency, event—does not, according to Schürmann, make thinking and action impossible. On the contrary, in freeing our experience from the authority of guiding first principles, a certain space is opened up for undetermined, free thought and action. Action is thus freed from its telos, from the rule of ends, from the strategic rationality which always sought to determine it.

Something like this anarchy principle is at work, I would suggest, in the post-foundational thinking of Stirner and Agamben, despite the latter’s reservations over Schürmann’s project in general (see Agamben, 2011: 64–65). This is particularly resonant in Stirner, who rejects all essences and fixed moral and rational categories as ideological illusions promulgated by a Christianised humanism, and claims to detect at the heart of every social reality and identity a fundamental emptiness and absence of being: ‘The essence of the world, so attractive and splendid, is for him who looks to the bottom of it—emptiness’ (Stirner, 1995: 40).

Indeed, his whole enterprise of egoistic self-constitution, about which I shall say more in the following section, is founded on a refusal of any positive identity or vocation:

4. Although Agamben believes that Schürmann’s thought does not sufficiently acknowledge the link between anarchy and government, he maintains that it is still possible to have an understanding of the ‘Ungovernable’ which is irreducible to the governing rationality of oikonomia. As we shall see, the notion of the ungovernable or insurrectionary subject emerges more clearly through my reading of ontological anarchy, particularly in relation to Stirner’s egoist and Agamben’s ‘whatever singularity’.

They say of God, ‘names name thee not’. That holds good of me: no concept expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me; they are only names. Likewise they say of God that he is perfect and has no calling to strive after perfection. That too holds good of me alone (Stirner, 1995: 342).

For Agamben, the positive figure of anarchy that he seeks to extricate from the workings of power refers to a way of being without foundation and without calling, freed from the governing apparatuses that impose upon us a certain essence and therefore a particular destiny: ‘Because human beings neither are nor have to be any essence, any nature, or any specific destiny their condition is the most empty and the most insubstantial of all’ (Agamben, 2000: 94). Ontological anarchy might be understood, in both thinkers, as an assertion of a form of life—that which Agamben calls the Ungovernable—that escapes, and cannot be expressed or contained within, any fixed identity or telos.

**PROFANE POLITICS**

The main implication of this ontologically anarchic position, I would argue, is the desacralising of politics—by which I mean the attempt to dispel the sacred and divine categories that our secular politics remain mired in. Both Agamben and Stirner engage in a critique of the modern project of secularisation, revealing its hidden theological dimension. Indeed, Agamben sees secularisation as essentially a form of repression:

It leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply moving them from one place to another. Thus the political secularisation of theological concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does nothing but displace the heavenly monarchy onto an earthly monarchy, leaving its power intact (Agamben, 2007: 77).

Let us try to understand exactly what Agamben means by this. The idea that there is a theological remnant within secular political institutions is familiar to us from thinkers such as Carl Schmitt (see Schmitt, 2005).